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Abstract: Corporate governance is mainly focused on ensuring that managers act in shareholders' 
interest. Therefore, this concept has emerged as essential to minimize conflicts in the company and to 
discourage managers to take leverage decisions that enhance their own benefits, to the detriment of 
shareholders. The degree to which managers can deviate from optimal behavior critically depends on 
the strength of corporate governance. Therefore, one can hypothesize that there must be a relationship 
between leverage financial performance of the enterprise and corporate governance quality. The aim 
of this paper is precisely to test this hypothesis and support the idea that firms with better governance 
system are more profitable and with a higher market value. It is also concerned  the link between 
business results, quality of governance, costs of accumulating experience by managers and therefore 
the degree of performance and market value. 
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1. Introduction  
Corporate governance seeks, primarily, how investors leads managers to provide an 
adequate return on invested capital. This problem is reflected by agency theory 
which proposes disciplining a inefficient management team, so that the managerial 
activities to provide a return on the measure of the capital brought by investors. 
Experience already suggests that managers with poor performance are facing 
disciplinary pressures from from internal and also external mechanisms of 
corporate control. 
Corporate governance is defined as all processes and structures through which the 
economic activities of enterprises are directed towards increasing long-term 
shareholders’ benefits by improving performance and responsibility policies, 
taking into account the interests of other stakeholders. 
The motivation to investigate the link between corporate governance system and 
performance of an enterprise can be seen from a dual perspective. First, in 
accordance with theories of costs, managers have an incentive to choose a level of 
governance to ensure compliance with all regulations for investors protection. 
Second, should be considered that the best governance practices, such as improved 
communication and a low level of vulnerability may cause investors to demand a 
lower risk premium, and managers can obtain an incentive to increase the 
efficiency, on a voluntary basis, of the company's governance practices, with some 
low implementation costs. 
Business performance is significantly influenced by the form of implemented 
governance, respectively the decision makers ability to identify and harmonize the 
interests of the most significant social partners. For developing the activity under 
high competitiveness, management should avoid potential conflicts between all 
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these partners and, moreover, to consider and to harmonize them. Ability of 
managers and other decision makers, such as shareholders, Board of Directors, 
auditors to harmonize and prioritize these interests, directly influences the risks and 
gains arising from investments in shares company. 
 
2. Concept and Mechanisms of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance describes the methods and systems used for managing 
organizations of all types and sizes, public and non-profit and also private 
companies and partnerships built form. In this respect, Sir Adrian Cadbury has 
defined corporate governance as a system by which companies are guided and 
controlled. This concept came into the literature and the good practice in the field 
in the last two decades. 
Corporate governance is seen as actual demarcation of rights and responsibilities of 
each group of stakeholders within the company. Transparency is a major indicator 
of governance standards in an economy. Thus was developed a series of 
recommended practices (ISA) that focus on separate managers of board and the 
existence of an audit committee and a remuneration committee. Currently, the 
concept is used to describe the action of government, the manner of managing, 
administering, including states, world bodies and businesses. 
Corporate governance can be seen from two perspectives: the behavioral one, 
referring to the interaction of managers, shareholders, employees, creditors, 
customers and suppliers, state and other interest groups within the overall strategy 
of the company and the normative one related to the set of regulations falling these 
relationships and behaviors, respectively company law, securities law and capital 
markets, bankruptcy law, competition law, stock exchange listing requirements, 
etc. 
In some European countries (Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Italy etc.), as well as the 
international organizations (OECD), the objective of developing governance 
mechanisms is improving the information on governance provided on the capital 
market and improving company performance, competitiveness and/or access to 
capital. For countries with tradition in the field and liquid capital markets (UK, 
France, Germany etc.), the main objective of these mechanisms concerns the 
activity of board, respectively improving its quality and the quality of information 
about corporate governance. 
Business practice has shown that there is no ideal system of corporate governance. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the choice of governance mechanisms by the 
company is not random, but is done according to characteristics such as: sector, 
size, concentration of ownership, shareholders’ power to influence the nature of 
performance measures and board structure. In each enterprise system consists of 
individual elements, which are interdependent and interact to determine a 
governance environment. 
Corporate governance mechanisms are introduced to control problems within the 
company and to ensure that managers are working in the interests of shareholders. 
In theory, the impact of internal governance on corporate information may be 
complementary or substitutive. In the first case, agency theory shows that when 
there is a large flow of information, adopting some governance mechanisms will 
strengthen the company's internal control and will provide a package of intensive 
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monitoring to reduce opportunistic behavior and asymmetric information. 
Managers are not likely to retain information for their benefits under such intensive 
monitoring environment, leading to improving quality of financial statements. In 
the second case, companies will not provide information for more governance 
mechanisms because a mechanism can substitute another one. If information 
asymmetry can be reduced through internal monitoring packages, the need to 
implement additional governance devices is reduced. Agency theory argues that, in 
a diffuse ownership, the companies will provide more information to reduce 
information costs and the asymmetry degree. 
Governance mechanisms can be classified into those that are specific to the 
enterprise and those specific to the country in which it operates. The first ones 
include ownership structure, board composition and competition for corporate 
control. Country-specific mechanisms include the legal environment, cultural 
environment, accounting standards and accounting practice field. 
Divergent interests of shareholders and managers constitutes a dominant element in 
agency theory applied in the enterprise. Such conflict may be the consideration of 
income claims in terms of the contract. Agency theorists argue that one of the 
reasons why shareholders may remain passive in the activities of corporate 
governance is the existence of some effective mechanisms to protect their interests, 
such as monitoring managerial process. Thus, owners should reduce costs and 
agency managers to control opportunism. Changes in corporate governance 
systems, following the financial scandals have led regulators to seek new ways to 
control the relationship between board and shareholders and to strengthen controls 
in the preparation of financial statements.  
Corporate governance mechanisms have an impact on business performance in a 
different ways, depending on financial and legal structure, which, in turn, exerts a 
differential influence on entities’ results. Following the Enron and WorldCom 
financial scandals, concerns have been intensified both theoretically and practically 
to elucidate the relationship between a firm's governance practices and operational 
performance, its financial market. 
 
3. Monitoring Managerial Activities and Firm Performance 
Monitoring practices that align the interests of owners and managers to prevent or 
hinder the managers to act only in self interest, preventing strategic objectives 
should be positively associated with firm performance. Thus, a high degree of 
monitoring should promote increased performance by preventing opportunistic 
management behavior. A higher level of monitoring should lead to achieving the 
upper limits of performance that can be achieved by deliberate actions of 
managers. 
CEOs are increasingly criticized for focusing on targets unrelated to company 
performance or to attempt to achieve short-term rather than long term profits as 
large. This behavior is often called "bounded" and is, in turn, often accused of 
damaging a company's competitive position. Thus, when a company’s performance 
is poor or declining is expected as rational measure from the owners to replace 
executives, especially the key people in the decision making. However, according 
to recent agency theory, separating the owner of control device is weaken its 
power. The basic premise of this theory is that managers and owners have different 
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motivations, and if there is no mechanism by which the first ones to be deterred 
from acting in their own interest, they will be free to maximize benefits directed 
towards themselves, in detriment of owners’ objectives. If, however, managers are 
prevented from acting against the interests of owners, regardless of conflicting 
motivations, theory of executive discretion is compromised. Therefore, owners of 
the companies should establish the best retention system that encourages managers 
to meet their interests. 
Without independence between “internal” and “external” market, managers’ 
remuneration may be largely determined by the cost of their services and not 
necessarily related to firm performance. Moreover, if the pay range is determined 
by supply and demand on external labor market, the primary means by which a 
manager is rewarded or whether prosecuted for higer or inadequate performance is 
renewal, respectively cancellation of his contract and not changing its 
compensation beyond market driven. In such cases, the turnover and/or turnure are 
better indicators of performance of managers than actual pay. 
According to the literature, board composition is another factor affecting firm 
performance and corporate decisions. Such a council could play an important role 
in limiting the power of a shareholder who would like to expropriate minority 
shareholders' interests, so it is expected that the decision making process being a 
rational one. But members of the board is likely to be influenced by shareholders 
who are able to elect Board of Directors and to appoint managers. Independent 
directors and supervisory authorities can improve efficiency and performance of an 
enterprise, if the independent directors take rational decisions, reducing the 
likelihood of irrational investment capital. 
On the other hand, more independent managers was related to improved financial 
performance improvement, reduced fraud and deterring income manipulation. 
Recent research on the business environment in a continuously modernization, 
indicates that an independent manager with a wide range of responsibilities 
acquires the necessary knowledge to increase financial performance. However, 
practice has shown that too much independence from the board may harm 
performance and monitoring process, which may damage the interests of 
shareholders. 
Revision of corporate governance code recommends that, within a company, 
assessing the performance of managers and board to improve overall efficiency of 
the company by maximizing the strengths and reduce weaknesses, even by 
proposing new members. Good practices recommend that colective evaluation to 
be presented to whole council, and the individual ones to be kept confidential and 
be comunicated to every manager in question. The main aspects covered are 
considering, in relation to corporate objectives, the effectiveness of the council’s 
work, each manager’s contribution and performance achived. 
 
4. Performance Evaluation based on Corporate Governance Practices 
Contemporary economic activities are dominated by the internationalization of 
markets. This has as a direct effect a severe competition which obliges enterprises 
to innovate constantly and to restructure themselfs. Pace of change and adaptation 
to this rhythm have become the key of performance and survival of these entities. 
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In order to study the link between governance and performance, it is important to 
take into account the structure of the enterprise in accordance with the legal system 
in which it operates. As companies bearing the costs of implementing governance 
systems, they must understand how the financial system interacts with the law, 
since it is an key factor influencing the performance registered. 
Performance measurement systems were introduced, initially for leadership and 
then for public responsbility, which put difficulties in implementation. Various 
reports show how the shortcomings of such systems can adversely affect 
performance monitoring and responsibility practices. In such circumstances, the 
corporate governance system should cover internal control systems, performance 
measurement and quality assurance. In other words, systems of responsibility and 
corporate governance need to manage any exposure of the company at risk.  
Performance measures implemented in a company should act as references for 
investor perceptions to internal changes and financial situation. Agency theory, as 
well as some specialists in the field says that a company's financial performance is 
inversely proportional to the size of the management structure. Thus, the increased 
number of directors of a company is negatively related to its financial performance. 
Performance evaluation was not included in the original code of corporate 
governance. There is only one principle which states that individual performance 
evaluation should show whether each manager continues to contribute effectively 
and if it is really commitment in this role. Good corporate governance provides 
improving efficiency and establish an interactive investment climate. Among the 
most important benefits of implementing high standards of companies management 
are: resource efficiency, lower cost of capital, increase investor confidence due to 
the reduction of sensitive discretionary attitude of managers and reducing 
corruption. Conversely, a weak corporate governance distorts the efficient 
allocation of capital in the economy, hinders investment, reduces the confidence of 
capital holders and favors corruption. 
Thus, investors claim that they are given at least the same importance to the 
information about corporate governance as to financial information in their 
investment decisions. While in Western Europe 56% of investors attach an equal or 
additional importance to the information on the governance system, in the countries 
of South-East and Africa, the percentage is much higher, with 85% of investors, the 
rest relying in a larger extent on financial and accounting reports of firms. 
Performance measurement should consider to capture the overall business, the 
following levels: 
-   financial and non-financial; 
-   strategic and operational; 
-   internal and external. 
Performance management is based on tools and activities for each level: strategic 
planning, defining objectives, priorities and organizational values, using objectives 
and measures of performance adequate for the organization, key processes, 
functions and employees, evaluation, personal development plans, different 
payment systems related to the performance. 
In accounting, but also finance are presented various associations between the 
different ways of presenting information – long time considered good governance 
practice – and reducing capital costs. Financial-accounting information have a 
direct, and also an indirect impact on control mechanisms for governance. 
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Company's accounting system provides information essential for: control of its 
current activities, planning strategies, tactics and future activities, ensuring optimal 
use of resources, measurement and performance evaluation, reduce the size of 
subjectivity in decision making, improving internal and external communication. 
The ways of accounting archiving may be influenced by chosing accounting 
practices by each company individually and by exogenous events that can affect 
performance measures. Measurement problems are minimized by constructive 
reproducing which shows models relatively similar as well as the scale of 
relationships of performance monitoring process with other variables controlled. 
Managers are evaluated directly in terms of accounting performance measures, but 
also of their effects, such as stock prices. For these reasons, managers may be 
tempted to manipulate financial information to serve their own interests. Firms 
with weak governance structures are more likely to manipulate earnings of a 
certain period. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Relevance for investors of information concerning quality and efficiency in 
governance and management of listed companies shows that improving corporate 
governance can be a strategy to increase their overall performance, respectively to 
increase the stock price of their shares on the capital market and hence to increase 
business value.  
The relationship between leading characteristics and firm performance continues to 
be a fundamental problem in corporate governance literature. The association 
between board size and corporate performance level variation occurs when large 
boards have problems of communication/coordination and agency problems. 
Companies with an effective system of governance are best placed to provide 
transparent information on decision and control activities which mainly concern the 
relationship between the firm and its investors, which also increases the confidence 
of investors and public. Therefore, in order that a better governance allows access 
to capital markets in the optimum conditions, the existence of good practices 
positively influences the market valuation and performance of an enterprise. 
Business practice shows that investors are willing to pay a certain premium for 
companies with good governance practices, being aware that financial performance 
is closely related to the managerial one. 
 
Aknowledgements:  
This work was supported by the the European Social Fund in Romania, under the 
responsibility of the Managing Authority for the Sectoral Operational Programme for 
Human Resources Development 2007-2013 [grant POSDRU/CPP 107/DMI 1.5/S/78342]. 
 
6. References 
Ghiţă, M., Iaţco, C., Brezuleanu, C.,  (2009). Guvernanţa corporativă şi auditul intern/Corporate 
governance and internal audit, Iaşi: TipoMoldova. 
Kaplan, R., Atkinson, A., Young, S., (2011) Management accounting: Information for Decision 
Making and Strategy Execution, U.S: Pearson Education. 
J o u r n a l  o f  A c c o u n t i n g  a n d  M a n a g e m e n t                      J A M  v o l .  2 ,  n o .  3 ( 2 0 1 2 )  
 
95 
 
Monks, R., Minow, N., (2011) Corporate governance, Fifth edition, London: Wiley Publishing. 
Tabără, N. & Briciu, S. (2012). Actualităţî şi perspective în contabilitate şi control de 
gestiune/Actualities and perspectives in accounting and management control, Iaşi: TipoMoldova. 
Tabără N., Ungureanu M., Evoluţia şi actualitatea conceptului de guvernanţă corporatistă pe plan 
mondial şi în România/The evolution and the current concept of corporate governance on worldwide 
and in Romania, Revista Finanţe Publice şi Contabilitate, Journal of Public Finance and Accounting, 
No. 3, 37-48. 
 
 
 
 
 
